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As noted, the Congressional Budget Office says that the federal deficit will shrink to 2.1 percent of GDP in two years and then start to grow again after 2015.  The most important factor contributing to the widening budget deficit over the next 10 years, according to the CBO, is not Social Security, or even Medicare, but a predicted rise in interest payments on the debt, as you can see here: The net interest projection is based on assumptions about what policy decisions the Federal Reserve will make in the future; in this case, the Fed is assumed to raise interest rates substantially.  The deficit tops out at 3.5 percent of GDP in 2023 in the latest CBO forecast (which is just above the 40-year average of 3.1 percent of GDP), but it continues to climb outside of the 10-year window, and this is what has many people concerned. Although much of the discussion of the long-term budget has been focused on “entitlements” and healthcare costs in particular, rising interest payments also play a key role in the CBO’s long-term forecast.  In fact, James Galbraith has argued that they play the key role in terms of arguments about the “sustainability” of the debt: The CBO’s assumption, which is that the United States must offer a real interest rate on the public debt… Read More

Whether it’s the terrible growth numbers in the eurozone (Eurostat), the revelation of spreadsheet errors in everyone’s favorite debt disaster study (for some of the non-spreadsheet-based problems with the Reinhart-Rogoff approach, see this 2010 working paper), or the fact that the US federal deficit is on track to shrink to a measly 2.1 percent of GDP in two years (CBO report here), the past couple months have offered up some embarrassing and inconvenient news for those who continue to push for austerity. Nonetheless, we’re unlikely to see any of this dramatically alter the budget debate, and the key to understanding why is to appreciate that there is a significant constituency among austerity supporters for whom most of this data is irrelevant.  It’s not just that this information isn’t likely to persuade them, but that for a certain species of austerian, it couldn’t possibly.  After four years of fiscal fear-mongering, it has become clear that for some ostensible austerity supporters, it was never really about the deficit. With last week’s updates, the CBO now predicts that the budget deficit will fall to 2.1 percent of GDP by 2015.  If that number means nothing to you, consider that the original Bowles-Simpson plan — the standard by which budget seriousness is measured in the press — called for a 2015 deficit of …… Read More

The Economic Crisis of 2008 and the Added Worker Effect in Transition Countries Tamar Khitarishvili Modeling the Housing Market in OECD Countries Philip Arestis and Ana Rosa González The Problem of Excess Reserves, Then and Now Walker F. Todd On the Franco-German Euro Contradiction and Ultimate Euro Battleground Jörg Bibow Currency Concerns under Uncertainty Sunanda Sen Indirect Domestic Value Added in Mexico’s Manufacturing Exports, by Origin and Destination Sector Gerardo Fujii-Gambero and Rosario Cervantes-Martínez Wages, Exchange Rates, and the Great Inflation Moderation Nathan Perry and Nathaniel Cline How the Fed Reanimated Wall Street Nicola Matthews Expanding Social Protection in Developing Countries Rania Antonopoulos

There are important changes in how many developing countries are approaching the problem of poverty. Specifically in the area of “social protection” policy — policies intended to prevent or alleviate income insecurity and poverty — these changes are reflected in attempts to move beyond one-off interventions and “safety nets” to policies designed to address some of the underlying problems causing economic vulnerability in the first place. In a new policy brief, developed with support from the United Nations Development Programme, Rania Antonopoulos considers how women’s economic empowerment can be advanced in the context of this evolution in social protection policy.  She zeroes in on the ways in which social protection policies, while addressing income gaps, also shape women’s opportunities through the manner in which these programs “see” or “position” women (whether intentionally or not).  To explain how this “positioning” works, she points to three different policies for addressing food insecurity (all targeted at women): cash transfers, free delivery of food staples, and access to land plus subsidized seed and fertilizer.  While all these interventions are aimed at reducing food insecurity, Antonopoulos observes that “there are stark differences between them in terms of the process through which deprivation is addressed, and from a gender perspective, differences in the (implicitly) assigned positioning of the beneficiary”: The first addresses income poverty by enabling… Read More

A couple of weeks ago, I mentioned Hyman Minsky’s new book, Ending Poverty: Jobs, Not Welfare (there is also a Kindle version).  Take a look at the cover – Minsky looking like a bit of a rougue! I thought you might enjoy my powerpoint presentation, given at the Levy-Ford annual Minsky conference in NYC in mid-April. It summarizes some of the main arguments of the book. However, you really need the book – it is brilliant, and a good antidote to all the silly arguments made by economists that we “need” to keep tens of millions of Americans unemployed. As Keynes put it: “The Conservative belief that there is some law of nature which prevents men from being employed, that it is ‘rash’ to employ men, and that it is financially ‘sound’ to maintain a tenth of the population in idleness is crazily improbable – the sort of thing which no man could believe who had not had his head fuddled with nonsense for years and years….” (J. M. Keynes) Here’s the powerpoint.

The formation of the eurozone represents “the wildest experiment in financial history,” according to C. J. Polychroniou: the eurozone was to involve the inclusion of independent states, with highly diverse economic systems and cultural settings, that were required to give up national currency sovereignty in exchange for a “foreign” currency without the backing of a treasury or a central bank ready to act as lender of last resort in the event of a financial crisis. And with the eurozone mired in recession (the latest numbers from Eurostat are here) and a deep depression in Greece, it might look like a failed experiment.  But it only looks this way, Polychroniou suggests, if you think of economic growth and the wellbeing of the average worker as among the primary goals of the project.  The setup of the EMU is not the result of some set of technical errors or oversights.  It is consistent with a long-developing attempt, culminating in the Maastricht Treaty, at transforming a social market economy into a laissez-faire market economy:  “it stemmed,” Polychroniou writes, “from the very premises of the fundamentally neoliberal economic thinking that had begun to take hold of the mindset of European policymakers in the 1980s.”  If anything, he argues, the struggles in the eurozone, particularly on the periphery, are being seized on as an opportunity… Read More

That’s the implication of a James Pethokoukis post linked to here by Reihan Salam.  Let’s assume for the sake argument that a federal budget surplus does emerge in 2015 (yesterday’s CBO report projected the 2015 deficit would be a mere 2.1% of GDP).  Salam expresses concern that such a scenario would leave Republicans, who have been banging the austerity drum since inauguration day 2009, in a political and policy bind.  It would allow Democrats to declare “mission accomplished,” as Salam puts it, leaving Republicans with no agenda. One problem with this analysis is that it assumes the voting public would even recognize/concede the existence of a budget surplus.  If you’ve been paying any attention to US public affairs, you’ll have observed that the realm of empirical fact is a fiercely contested battlefield (see warming, global).  And on budget matters, as Dimitri Papadimitriou has pointed out, the battlefield is tilted in one direction:  “The deficit has arguably gained the distinction of being the single most widely misunderstood public policy issue in America. Just 6% (6!) of respondents in a recent poll correctly stated that it had been shrinking, which has in fact been the case for several years, while 10 times more, 62%, wrongly believed that it’s been getting bigger.” Now, it ought to be mentioned that no one should get… Read More

In a new policy note, Jan Kregel draws out some of the policy lessons of the Cypriot deposit tax episode for plans to create a system of EU-wide deposit insurance.  In addition to the necessity of a strong central bank (the ECB in this case) standing behind the deposit insurance scheme (which does not appear to be part of the current plans), Jan Kregel explains why a certain amount of moral hazard is inescapable. We can see this by looking at two types of deposits that correspond to the dual functions of banks:  deposits of currency and coin, and deposits created when loans are made.  If a bank makes bad loans — and as Kregel points out, “it is the failure of the holder of the second type of deposit [loan-created deposits] to redeem its liability that is the major cause of bank failure” — the first type of depositor (of currency and coin) should not bear the brunt of these bad decisions.  The role of deposit insurance, one might argue, is to provide such protection. But since deposit insurance has to be extended to all of a banks’ deposits (up to a certain level), including those created by loans, moral hazard is inevitable.  Ideally, deposit insurance would be structured in such a way as to distinguish between deposits based… Read More

Narayana Kocherlakota is the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and is known for an uncommon feat in high-level policy circles:  he changed his mind.  Originally a monetary policy hawk, Kocherlakota has become a supporter of looser Fed policy.  He spoke recently at the Levy Institute’s Minsky conference in New York, and some reports of the speech–at least as rendered by headline writers–may create the impression that Kocherlakota has been reconsidering his conversion. “Kocherlakota Says Low Fed Rates Create Financial Instability,” one publication announced.  In fact, what Kocherlakota said (see the full speech below) was far more nuanced (and to be fair, most of the media reports grasped the key points.  I’m told it’s fairly common for reporters not to write their own headlines).  He argued that low-rate policy can create phenomena that are commonly taken to be signs of financial instability:  “unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity. All of these financial market outcomes are often interpreted as signifying financial market instability.” If low interest rates created financial crises of the sort that tanked the global economy in 2007/2008, this would be a pretty good argument for siding with the hawks.  But Kocherlakota’s actual, stated views are perfectly consistent with a… Read More

In economics, there is a remarkable “stickiness” in bad ideas and confusions. In fact, some bad ideas and confusions never seem to go away. For instance, last summer Martin Feldstein bravely suggested that euro weakening would help solve the euro crisis and rescue Europe (WSJ: “A weaker euro could rescue Europe”). Similarly, in a Bruegel Institute Policy Brief also published last summer and titled “Intra-euro rebalancing is inevitable but insufficient,” Zsolt Darvas argued that euro weakening was badly needed to restore competitiveness of euro crisis countries whose perceived inability to rebalance their external positions was a major root of the euro crisis. More recently, these two issues, euro external competitiveness and intra-euro competitiveness imbalances, were also bundled together in a piece by David Keohane titled “Why strength could be the single currency’s undoing” (FT.com 17 April 2013). Mr. Keohane seemed to identify a “euro paradox,” or even two paradoxes actually. One apparent paradox is that policy measures by the euro authorities that boost confidence in the euro run the risk of doing damage to it by undermining its long-term existence through enticing euro strength, which would postpone an export-led recovery. The other seeming paradox is that the single currency cannot exist at different levels for different countries and that it will therefore always be expensive for some and cheap for… Read More

In recent days both Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman have written good pieces arguing against the austerity marketed by deficit hyperventilators. We can thank Thomas Herndon’s muckraking that pushed the topic front and center, showing that there is no empirical evidence in support of the austerian’s claim that big government debts slow growth. Here’s Krugman’s argument. To briefly summarize, historical experience has demonstrated that the “growth through austerity” argument is false. Further, the monetarists have also got it wrong: monetary policy won’t get us out of this recession trap; what we really need is a good dose of fiscal policy. Given that we are in a “liquidity trap,” we can safely expand government spending without worrying about the usual downside to deficits. And in a liquidity trap, there is really no difference between Modern Money Theory and the conventional ISLM analysis. It is only once we return to a more “normal” situation that budget deficits would “matter” in the sense that they’d cause problems. DeLong amplifies the argument here. Once we’re out of the liquidity trap, then sustained budget deficits will push up interest rates and crowd out private spending (especially investment). This is basic ISLM stuff. For those who have not taken intermediate macro, it is enough to know that in current conditions increasing budget deficits will not raise… Read More

When top managers at our largest financial firms claim to have been oblivious of dangerous financial practices carried out under their watch, the most serious implications for regulatory reform don’t actually follow from scenarios in which these managers are lying.  It’s a bigger deal, in terms of how far we need to go in changing the way we regulate the banking system, if they’re telling the truth. Bad apples, after all, can be replaced.  But what if the ignorance is real; if managers really don’t know what’s going on in the units below them due to the sheer complexity of the financial institutions they’re running?  This might be thought of as a convenient excuse; a universal “get out of jail free” card.  But if true, it has more far-reaching, radical implications than most Bankers Behaving Badly scenarios, because it points to a problem that touches on the very structure of the financial system and its key institutions. This, says Jan Kregel, is part of the the deeper lesson of JP Morgan Chase’s “London whale” fiasco.  In a new policy brief, Kregel reviews the recent Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report on JP Morgan Chase’s difficulties and draws out the lessons for financial reform: The most probable explanation of the misinformation concerning the “London whale” affair is a massive failure of… Read More