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From a February 2012 presentation delivered by Research Associate Michael Hudson: Suppose you were alive back in 1945 and were told about all the new technology that would be invented between then and now: the computers and internet, mobile phones and other consumer electronics, faster and cheaper air travel, super trains and even outer space exploration, higher gas mileage on the ground, plastics, medical breakthroughs and science in general. You would have imagined what nearly all futurists expected: that we would be living in a life of leisure society by this time. Rising productivity would raise wages and living standards, enabling people to work shorter hours under more relaxed and less pressured workplace conditions. Why hasn’t this occurred in recent years? In light of the enormous productivity gains since the end of World War II – and especially since 1980 – why isn’t everyone rich and enjoying the leisure economy that was promised? If the 99% is not getting the fruits of higher productivity, who is? Where has it gone? Read the rest here at Naked Capitalism.

Below is the abstract of a presentation to be delivered by Frank Veneroso on Monday April 30th (1:30pm) at the Levy Institute: Most orthodox explanations of what we call asset bubbles and financial crises attribute them to exogenous shocks to the economy.  For example, a Fed monetary policy error supposedly caused the Great Depression with its three great banking crises, and a Greenspan monetary policy excess led to the asset bubbles and eventual financial crisis of the last two decades. For Hyman Minsky financial fragility and eventual financial crisis was endogenous to capitalist economies.  Minsky saw this process occurring over two time frames.  First, over the course of a single business cycle, fading memories of the cash flow shortfalls of the most recent recession led to more positive profit expectations, greater fixed investment, a higher reliance on debt finance, and an overall condition of greater financial fragility.  In addition to this “financial instability” hypothesis appropriate to a single business cycle, Minsky also saw an endogenous process of ever greater financial fragility from business cycle to business cycle throughout the post war period.  This endogenous process resulted from ever greater bailouts by Big Government and the Big Central Bank in the recurrent post war recessions that threatened financial crisis and debt deflation.  In effect, an interplay between private risk taking and… Read More

The Levy Institute has announced its collaboration with the daily financial newspaper Express, based in Athens, Greece. Beginning with its April 22 issue, Express will publish each week, on a specially designated page in its Sunday edition, articles, research summaries, and interviews by Levy Institute scholars and associates. The collaboration is a natural extension of the Institute’s recent undertaking in translating selected publications into Greek as part of its mission to disseminate its research findings to the global community, and as a gesture of solidarity with a nation under severe duress due to an unprecedented economic crisis. The editorial work for this collaborative project will be carried out by C. J. Polychroniou, a research associate and policy fellow at the Levy Institute. Founded in 1962, Express is one of Greece’s most respected financial dailies. It is read widely within the business and finance community, and by government officials, economists, and other professionals. In addition to its print edition, the paper has one of the most popular newspaper websites in Greece, averaging 800,000 visitors per month. The Levy Institute is continually expanding its list of publications available in Greek translation. To access this list, click here.

In a radio segment for Ian Masters’ “Background Briefing,” Dimitri Papadimitriou speculates that Germany might just end up being the eurozone country that decides it’s not worth staying in the union. Germany, says Papadimitriou, has boxed itself in such that, as one of the only eurozone countries that’s growing, it must ultimately bear the major responsibility for the rescue packages that are being offered for troubled countries like Portugal, Greece (x2), and Ireland—and that may soon have to be put in place for Spain.  While an exit is unlikely as long as Angela Merkel is in power, Papadimitriou reminds us that she’s up for re-election next year, and the winds of political change have started blowing in Europe. Listen to or download the whole interview here (Papadimitriou’s segment begins at minute 37, with the discussion turning to German exit around 44:30):  http://archive.kpfk.org/mp3/kpfk_120423_170004dbriefing.MP3

  (click to enlarge) Has the tough labor market of the past five years caused an increase in the severity of the economic problems facing women who are raising children mostly on their own? In this blog entry, we provide updated information on a topic featured in a 2010 post to this blog. The idea of the figure shown above is to illustrate how the labor-market situation affects this group of women (known as “female householders” or by the roughly equivalent category of “women maintaining families”) and their children. The red line indicates that both of the two most recent recessions triggered sharp increases in the relevant unemployment rate. The most recent increase began in 2007—about five years ago. Fortunately, the first few months’ data for 2012 indicate a possible reversal of the post-2007 trend, with the unemployment rate falling to 11.5 percent on average for January, February, and March, compared to 12.9 percent last year. Will lower unemployment bring lower poverty rates for female householders and their children? The 2010 post referred to above noted that poverty among families with a female householder rose from 2000 through 2008. This improvement followed a decline that lasted through most of the 1990s, the decade of a landmark welfare reform bill at the federal level. Unfortunately, according to Census Bureau data, the upward… Read More

The Washington Post is casually informing its readers that the eurozone’s austerity programs are really aimed at addressing all that government profligacy everyone knows was rampant in the run up to the crisis. This seems like another good opportunity to post this chart, showing net debt as a percentage of GDP in some key eurozone countries, pre and post crisis (click to enlarge): As you can see, for almost all of these countries the crisis was largely a cause of rising public debt ratios, not an effect.  Spain, which as the Post article notes is the latest country on the eurozone hot seat, had a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 27 percent in 2007 (and as Dean Baker points out, Spain was running a budget surplus).  Reckless! If you’re really looking for a debt-related problem in the buildup to the crisis, take a glance at the right-hand side of the chart.  There you’ll see private debt ratios at significantly higher levels.  For more on this and the real story behind the problems in the eurozone, see this policy brief by Dimitri Papadimitriou and Randall Wray (short version here). Update:  Paul Krugman adds more (responding to a piece in the FT by Kenneth Rogoff) by posting a graph showing the trend in public debt ratios in the eurozone periphery during the 2000s. … Read More

From the Introduction to Beyond the Minsky Moment, a recent publication of the Levy Institute’s program on Monetary Policy and Financial Structure: A new era of reform cannot be simply a series of piecemeal changes. Rather, a thorough, integrated approach to our economic problems must be developed; policy must range over the entire economic landscape and fit the pieces together in a consistent, workable way: Piecemeal approaches and patchwork changes will only make a bad situation worse. —Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy It’s been almost five years since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Stepping back and surveying the last half decade’s worth of policy responses in the United States, what we see before us looks very much like the “piecemeal” and “patchwork” pattern of reform that Minsky cautioned against in Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (1986). What’s more, if there ever was any real political space for fundamental reform of the financial system, it has since disappeared, even as the economic wounds left by the crisis continue to fester. The battle to shape the rule-making and implementation process of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act is ongoing, but as this monograph attempts to clarify, Dodd-Frank—indeed, the whole host of policy reactions (and nonreactions) since 2007—is largely undergirded by an approach to financial regulation that is incomplete and inadequate. Another serious… Read More

Although some considered (or pretended to consider) the eurozone crisis to have been “solved” with the last Greek bailout/bond swap, reality “begs to differ,” says C. J. Polychroniou.  In his latest one-pager, Polychroniou provides an update on the status of “eurozone crisis 2.0” as the spotlight shifts to Spain, Portugal, and Italy: The eurozone crisis isn’t back: it never left. It merely went into a very brief hibernation, as the world watched Europe’s leaders trying out various fixes for the wrong crisis. No matter how much cheap money the ECB provides or how high the EC “firewall” rises, Europe’s economic sickness will not be cured without massive government intervention to get the regional economy rolling again. Read the whole thing here.

In a Bloomberg article that details how banks in the eurozone periphery have begun carrying increasing proportions of the debt issued by their own nations’ governments (while banks in the core have reduced their holdings of peripheral sovereign debt), Dimitri Papadimitriou comments on some of the consequences of this “national fragmentation of credit”: “If there’s a private-sector restructuring of Portuguese sovereign debt, then Portugal’s banks will need a bailout like Greek banks did,” Dimitri Papadimitriou, president of the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York, said in an interview. In Spain, stronger banks such as Banco Santander SA (SAN), the country’s largest lender, can handle losses from their sovereign holdings, while weaker savings institutions stung by soured real estate loans will need help, Papadimitriou said. Italian banks probably are buying more of their country’s debt because they can sell it to retail customers who still have an appetite for the securities, he said. Read the article here.

The annual Minsky conference, co-sponsored by the Levy Institute and the Ford Foundation, was held this past week in NYC. The audio transcripts of all the presentations (including one by yours truly) are online here. (I will also add my powerpoint below so you can look at it while listening to the audio.) My presentation quickly summarized results of a project I am directing that examines democratic governance and accountability of the Federal Reserve, focusing on its response to the global financial crisis. You can read our first report here. I won’t go into that today. I just wanted to very quickly summarize two quite interesting statements made by others over the course of the conference. First, Joe Stiglitz had a great analogy about derivatives. Recall that part of the reason for the creation and explosion of derivatives was to spread risk. For example, mortgage-backed securities were supposed to make the global financial system safer by spreading US real estate risks all over the world. He then compared that to, say, a deadly flu virus. Would you want to spread the virus all over the world, or quarantine it? Remember Warren Buffet’s statement that all these new financial products are “weapons of mass destruction”–like the 1914 flu virus. And, indeed, just as Stiglitz said, spreading those deadly weapons all over… Read More

(cross posted at EconoMonitor) Since Paul Krugman kicked-off a heated discussion about Minsky’s views on banks, and because the annual “Minsky Conference” co-sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Levy Economics Institute occurred this past week, I thought it would be useful to run a couple of posts laying out what Minsky was all about. This first piece will detail his early work on what led up to development of his famous “financial instability hypothesis.” Minsky’s Early Contributions In his publications in the 1950s through the mid 1960s, Minsky gradually developed his analysis of the cycles. First, he argued that institutions, and in particular financial institutions, matter. This was a reaction against the growing dominance of a particular version of Keynesian economics best represented in the ISLM model. Although Minsky had studied with Alvin Hansen at Harvard, he preferred the institutional detail of Henry Simons at Chicago. The overly simplistic approach to macroeconomics buried finance behind the LM curve; further, because the ISLM analysis only concerned the unique point of equilibrium, it could say nothing about the dynamics of a real world economy. For these reasons, Minsky was more interested in the multiplier-accelerator model that allowed for the possibility of explosive growth. In some of his earliest work, he added institutional ceilings and floors to produce a variety of possible… Read More