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Dan Monaco, writing for The Straddler, attended this year’s Minsky Summer Seminar at the Levy Institute and put together an engrossing (and accessible) article that looks at the work of Hyman Minsky, paying particular attention to Minsky’s interpretation of Keynes (including his views about the misinterpretation of Keynes by mainstream economics).  The article is sprinkled with excerpts from Monaco’s interview of Dimitri Papadimitriou: “Economists have lost their credibility because they do not actually deal with the real world,” Dimitri Papadimitriou, President of the Levy Institute, told me in my conversation with him. … “Minsky was in some ways a pioneer. He saw that economic theory assumed that everything is known and that there is some tendency of the system to reach for equilibrium and, at times, to reach periods of ‘tranquility,’ as he preferred to call them. Of course, he never believed that stability was possible. He didn’t believe in the invisible hand. There’s a reason why it’s invisible—because it’s not there.” Read the entire thing here.

Italy is getting a new government today, which is expected to act rapidly to strengthen the Italian growth potential, thus addressing the public debt “problem.” However, it is doubtful that any new government in Italy can succeed in addressing the European financial crisis without concerted action at the European level. I endorse at least the following portion of this petition: “…we maintain that the new Italian government should rapidly act through the appropriate European institution, with the required determination and political alliances, to obtain a firm and unlimited guarantee by the ECB on the European sovereign debts…” http://documentoeconomisti.blogspot.com/2011/11/to-parliament-of-italian-republic-to.html

Relevant to the question of the legal limits of relying on the European Central Bank as lender of last resort, Tyler Durden observes Jens Weidmann, head of the Bundesbank, defending the narrow view of the ECB’s role in a recent Financial Times interview: FT: Can you explain why the ECB cannot be lender of last resort? JW: The eurosystem is a lender of last resort – for solvent but illiquid banks. It must not be a lender of last resort for sovereigns because this would violate Article 123 of the EU treaty [prohibiting monetary financing – or central bank funding of governments]. I cannot see how you can ensure the stability of a monetary union by violating its legal provisions. I think the prohibition of monetary financing is very important in ensuring the credibility and independence of the central bank, which allow us to deliver on our primary objective of price stability. This is a very fundamental issue. If we now overstep that mandate, we call into question our own independence. This looks like two separate arguments:  (1) lender of last resort activities would violate Article 123; (2) this prohibition of LLR activities (“for sovereigns”) is a good idea anyway, because it preserves ECB independence. The second argument, if this is what Weidmann intends, would imply that a great many… Read More

If you missed last week’s Reuters-sponsored Keynes vs. Hayek debate at the Asia Society, video of the event is attached below, beginning with James Galbraith’s contribution. The debate, predictably, ended up being more about the last two-and-a-half years of economic policy.  Note also the way in which this turns into a Democratic Keynesianism vs Republican Keynesianism debate; due in no small part to the Wall Street Journal‘s Steve Moore, who argues that instead of Obama’s wretched ARRA, a mixture of tax cuts and spending increases, what we really need is … a mixture of tax cuts and spending increases.  The key to being a Moore-style Schmeynesian, as near as I can tell, is that when describing Obama’s policies one ignores the tax cuts, and when describing Reagan-era fiscal policy one mumbles something about “defense” rather than spending increases. (Note also Galbraith’s list of Hayek’s later policy preferences, which would place Hayek somewhere in the progressive wing of today’s Democratic Party).

(cross posted at EconoMonitor) For more than a decade, I’ve been arguing that the EMU was designed to fail. It was based on the pious hope that markets would not notice that member states had abandoned their currencies when they adopted the euro, thereby surrendering fiscal and monetary policy to the center. The problem was that while the center was quite happy to centralize monetary policy through the august auspices of the Bundesbank (with the ECB playing the role of the hapless dummy whose strings were pulled in Germany), the center never wanted to offer fiscal policy capable of funding essential spending. (See also Nouriel Roubini’s Eurozone Crisis: Here Are the Options, Now Choose and  Marshall Auerback’s piece: The Road to Serfdom.) Member states became much like US states, but with two key differences. First, while US states can and do rely on fiscal transfers from Washington—which controls a budget equal to more than a fifth of US GDP—EMU member states got an underfunded European Parliament with a total budget of less than 1% of Europe’s GDP. This meant that member states were responsible for dealing not only with the routine expenditures on social welfare (health care, retirement, poverty relief) but also had to rise to the challenge of economic and financial crises. The second difference is that Maastricht criteria… Read More

(Click to enlarge.) The most recent Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data released this month show an increase in the number of job openings available throughout the United States, as reported by Catherine Rampell in the New York Times “Economix” blog. As of the end of September, there were 3.8 unemployed people per job opening, based on raw data. (Rampell reports a slightly higher ratio, based on seasonally adjusted figures.) These ratios use the official definition of unemployment, leading to a rather low count of the number of workers individually affected by the bad labor market. In the figure above, I compare the number of job openings with the number of unemployed people, using separate bars for each gender. In addition, I include bars representing two more groups that are covered by the BLS’s broad “U6 measure of labor underutilization” but not by the official unemployment rate: 1) those working only part-time for economic reasons; and 2) people who are “marginally attached to the workforce.” The latter group includes discouraged workers and many others who would almost certainly be working if the job market were sufficiently robust.* The green bar on the right shows the total number of people in all of these categories of underutilized workers—about 23.9 million, or 7.0 underutilized workers per job opening.   *Note: Click link… Read More

1) Marshall Auerback, at New Economic Perspectives, digs into the issue of whether the ECB is legally permitted to engage in the sort of “lender of last resort” activities that many think are key to mitigating this crisis: The notion that it cannot act as lender of last resort is disingenuous:  The ECB does have the legal mandate under its “financial stability” mandate which was provided under the Treaty of Maastricht.  True it is fair to say that the whole Treaty of Maastricht is full of ambiguity.  The institutional policy framework within which the euro has been introduced and operates (Article 11 of Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the European Central Bank) has several key elements.  One notable feature of the operation of the ESCB is the apparent absence of the lender of last resort facility, which is an issue raised by the WSJ today, and which Draghi uses to justify his inaction.  But it’s not as clear-cut as suggested: The Protocols under which the ECB is established enables, but does not require, the ECB to act as a lender of last resort. Proof that the ECB exploits these ambiguities when it suits them is evident in its bond buying program.  The ECB articles say it cannot buy government bonds in the primary market. And this rule was once… Read More

Here is another flattering mention of Wynne Godley‘s prescient writings on the euro, this time from John Cassidy’s blog at the New Yorker. (Cassidy sat in on the Keynes side of this week’s “Keynes vs. Hayek” debate.) Many of Godley’s publications at the Levy Institute (“haven for heterodox thought,” as Cassidy calls it), including his early observations about the exponential growth in private debt that marked the Greenspan economy, can be found here. Gennaro Zezza, together with Marc Lavoie, is also putting together a new book featuring Wynne Godley’s writings (The Stock-Flow Consistent Approach: Selected Writings of Wynne Godley).  It will be released in early 2012: This book is the intellectual legacy of Wynne Godley, the famous British economist who was the head of the Department of Applied Economics at the University of Cambridge for nearly 20 years, after having been deputy director of the Economic section at the UK Treasury. These selected writings are useful not only as a summary of the evolution of Godley’s analysis, but also equip economists with new tools for the achievement of sustainable economic growth. Professor Godley’s work always originated from puzzles in the real world economy, rather than from curiosities in economic models, and his work has retained its practicality; the stock-flow models have proved to be effective in predicting recent recessions. These… Read More

There’s an interesting (and unsettling) section of Martin Mayer’s presentation at the Minsky Conference that I’ll quote at length in which he talks about the reception of Hyman Minsky’s work.  Add this to the growing “what’s wrong with the economics profession?” folder: I have found my own explanation, rather a disturbing one, for Hy’s relative obscurity despite the importance and intrinsic interest of his work. Several people, some of whom consider themselves followers of Hy, have noted to me that there isn’t much published work, which is nonsense: there is a lot of published work. But relatively little of it is in the economic journals. It’s in the peer-review journals. The most important person in Minsky’s career was Bernard Shull, who has also been at a lot of these meetings, and I talked to him the other day. . . . He was a young member of the research staff at the Philadelphia Fed when he read Hy’s original article on central banks and the money market in 1957. Shull moved onto the Board of Governors to conduct a study on how the discount window actually operated and how it should operate. It was through working on that study that Hy developed the financial instability hypothesis, which was published originally in detail as a Federal Reserve document. Hy’s important work… Read More

The 20th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference, organized by the Levy Institute with support from the Ford Foundation, featured a broad range of speakers, including Gary Gensler (CFTC Chairman—occasioning some interesting back-and-forth in Q&A regarding commodities speculation), Paul McCulley, Andrew Sheng, Phil Angelides, Charles Plosser, Gary Gorton, Charles Evans, Vitor Constancio (Vice President of the ECB), Sheila Blair (head of the FDIC), Martin Mayer (who is apparently writing a biography of Minsky), and more.  The proceedings, including Q&A sessions, can be found here; select audio can be accessed here. There’s a lot of good material to mine, but I’d like to highlight one particular session:  “Financial Journalism and Financial Reform: What’s Missing from the Headlines?” (the title explains itself), moderated by John Cassidy of the New Yorker and featuring Jeff Madrick, Joe Nocera, Steve Randy Waldman, and Francesco Guerrera (see “Session 2” for the audio).  There’s a great quotation from Steve Randy Waldman here:  “Goldman Sachs is just an off-balance sheet special purpose vehicle of the United States government.  Lloyd Blankfein is either a civil servant or a government contractor.  It’s just [that] his pay is out of line.” The context is a discussion (starting at the 9:50 mark of Waldman’s presentation) that jumps off from this Minsky quotation: “financial reform needs to confront the public nature of much that… Read More

Among the (many) obstacles to working out a solution to the crisis in the eurozone is resistance to schemes that involve debt buyouts, national guarantees, mutual insurance, and fiscal transfers.  Stuart Holland has a new one-pager and policy note in which he suggests a twin-track strategy for solving the crisis that does not rely on any of the above. His recommended strategies revolve around using the EIF (European Investment Fund) as an issuer of eurobonds, and having member-states with at-risk bonds convert a share of them, through enhanced cooperation, into EU bonds (allowing, for instance, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Finland to keep their own bonds).  According to Holland, neither of these strategies would require ratification by national parliaments or an alteration of the EU treaty.  The one-pager builds on an earlier policy note by Holland and Yanis Varoufakis, “A Modest Proposal for Overcoming the Euro Crisis.” Read Holland’s one-pager here and the elaborated policy note version here.

At Pragmatic Capitalist, Cullen Roche writes about the “eerily prescient” predictions regarding the euro made by Modern Money Theorists and economists looking at sectoral balances.  Roche quotes from Randall Wray’s Understanding Modern Money (see in particular p. 91ff), a paper by Stephanie Kelton (Bell), and a Wynne Godley article written in 1997 (“Curried Emu — the meal that fails to nourish,” Observer, Aug. 31).  From Godley: If a government does not have its own central bank on which it can draw cheques freely, its expenditures can be financed only by borrowing in the open market in competition with businesses, and this may prove excessively expensive or even impossible, particularly under ‘conditions of extreme emergency.’ … The danger, then, is that the budgetary restraint to which governments are individually committed will impart a disinflationary bias that locks Europe as a whole into a depression it is powerless to lift. See also Godley’s earlier piece (1992) in the London Review of Books, “Maastricht and All That“: I recite all this to suggest, not that sovereignty should not be given up in the noble cause of European integration, but that if all these functions are renounced by individual governments they simply have to be taken on by some other authority. The incredible lacuna in the Maastricht programme is that, while it contains a… Read More