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Working Paper No.606
02 August 2010
Changes in Central Bank Procedures during the Subprime Crisis and Their Repercussions on Monetary Theory
AbstractThe subprime financial crisis has forced several North American and European central banks to take extraordinary measures and to modify some of their operational procedures. These changes have made even clearer the deficiencies and lack of realism in mainstream monetary theory, as can be found in both undergraduate textbooks and most macroeconomic models. They have also forced monetary authorities to reject publicly some of the assumptions and key features of mainstream monetary theory, fearing that, on that mistaken basis, actors in the financial markets would misrepresent and misjudge the consequences of the actions taken by the monetary authorities. These changes in operational procedures also have some implications for heterodox monetary theory; in particular, for post-Keynesian theory.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the implications of these changes in operational procedures for our understanding of monetary theory. The evolution of the operating procedures of the Federal Reserve since August 2007 is taken as an exemplar. The American case is particularly interesting, both because it was at the center of the financial crisis and because the US monetary system and its federal funds rate market are the main sources of theorizing in monetary economics.
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Policy Notes No.2
22 July 2010
Global Central Bank Focus
AbstractThe developed world faces a cyclical deficiency of aggregate demand, the product of a liquidity trap and the paradox of thrift, in the context of headwinds born of ongoing structural realignments. According to Paul McCulley, PIMCO, front-loaded fiscal austerity would only add to that deflationary cocktail. This is why the market vigilantes are fleeing risk assets, which depend on growth for valuation support, rather than the sovereign debt of fiat-currency countries. McCulley bases his outlook on the financial balances approach (double-entry bookkeeping) pioneered by the late Wynne Godley, who was a distinguished scholar at the Levy Institute. Godley’s analytical framework, says McCulley, should be the workhorse of discussions on global rebalancing.
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Public Policy Brief No.113
21 July 2010
Endgame for the Euro?
AbstractCritics argue that the current crisis has exposed the profligacy of the Greek government and its citizens, who are stubbornly fighting proposed social spending cuts and refusing to live within their means. Yet Greece has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the European Union (EU), and its social safety net is modest compared to the rest of Europe. Since implementing its austerity program in January, it has reduced its budget deficit by 40 percent, largely through spending cuts. But slower growth is causing revenues to come in below targets, and fuel-tax increases have contributed to growing inflation. As the larger troubled economies like Spain and Italy also adopt austerity measures, the entire continent could find government revenues collapsing.
No rescue plan can address the central problem: that countries with very different economies are yoked to the same currency. Lacking a sovereign currency and unable to devalue their way out of trouble, they are left with few viable options—and voters in Germany and France will soon tire of paying the bill. A more far-reaching solution is needed.
Download Public Policy Brief No. 113, 2010 PDF (662.55 KB) -
Policy Notes No.1
12 July 2010
Economic Policy for the Real World
AbstractThe nation’s economic challenges are daunting. Restoring robust American prosperity and widespread economic opportunity will not be easy. But, as Hyman Minsky stressed, “Economic systems are not natural systems…. Policy can change both the details and the overall character of the economy.”
It’s clear that what we are now facing is not simply a cyclical crisis, or even an employment crisis, writes Charles J. Whalen. Rather, it is a standard-of-living-and-economic-opportunity crisis—the latest phase in a decades-long “silent depression.” In order to resolve it, our policy response must reflect that we are dealing with a deep-seated structural problem, one rooted in the evolution of US economic development. Policymakers must pursue an agenda of recovery and reform that includes, at minimum, a major assistance package for state and local governments; more relief for the unemployed and those facing foreclosure; tougher supervision of financial institutions; stronger automatic stabilizers (e.g., public service employment); policies that foster economic opportunities for working families; improved retirement security; and labor law reform that gives workers a more realistic chance to organize and bargain collectively.
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Working Paper No.605
29 June 2010
Detecting Ponzi Finance
AbstractDifferent frameworks of analysis lead to different conceptions of financial instability and financial fragility. On one side, the static approach conceptualizes financial instability as an unfortunate byproduct of capitalism that results from unpredictable random forces that no one can do anything about except prepare for through adequate loss reserves, capital, and liquidation buffers. On the other side, the evolutionary approach conceptualizes financial instability as something that the current economic system invariably brings upon itself through internal market and nonmarket forces, and that requires change in financial practices rather than merely good financial buffers. This paper compares the two approaches in order to lay the foundation for the empirical analysis developed within the evolutionary approach. The paper shows that, with the use of macroeconomic data, it is possible to detect financial fragility, especially Ponzi finance. The methodology is applied to residential housing in the US household sector and is able to capture some of the trends that are known to be sources of economic difficulties. Notably, the paper finds that Ponzi finance was going on in the housing sector from at least 2004 to 2007, which concurs with other works based on more detailed data.
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Public Policy Brief No.112
28 June 2010
The Great Crisis and the American Response
AbstractSenior Scholar James K. Galbraith argues the fundamental illusion of viewing the US economy through the free-market prism of deregulation, privatization, and a benevolent government operating mainly through monetary stabilization—the prevailing view among economists over the past three decades. The real sources of American economic power, he says, lie with those who manage and control the public‑private sectors—especially the public institutions in those sectors—and who often have a political agenda in hand. Galbraith calls this the predator state: a government that is intent, not upon restructuring the rules in any idealistic way, but upon using the existing institutions as a device for political patronage on a grand scale. And it is closely aligned with financial deregulation.
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Public Policy Brief No.112
28 June 2010
Η μεγάλη κρίση και η αμερικανική αντίδραση
AbstractΟ Ανώτατος Μελετητής James K. Galbraith εξετάζει κριτικά την ψευδαίσθηση του να βλέ̟πει κανείς την οικονομία των ΗΠΑ μέσα από το πρίσμα της ελεύθερης αγοράς, της α̟πορρύθμισης, των ιδιωτικο̟ποιήσεων και μιας καλοπροαίρετης κυβέρνησης η οποία λειτουργεί κυρίως μέσω της νομισματικής σταθερο̟ποίησης—η ε̟πικρατούσα άποψη ανάμεσα στους οικονομολόγους τις τελευταίες τρείς δεκαετίες. Οι πραγματικές π̟ηγές της αμερικανικής ισχύος, ισχυρίζεται, βρίσκονται με εκείνους που διαχειρίζονται και ελέγχουν τους δημόσιους-ιδιωτικούς τομείς—ειδικά τους δημόσιους θεσμούς σε αυτούς τους τομείς—και οι οποίοι έχουν συνήθως μαζί τους μια π̟ολιτική ατνζέντα. Ο Galbraith αποκαλεί το πλαίσιο αυτό «το αρπακτικό κράτος»: μια κυβέρνηση που είναι απ̟οφασισμένη, όχι να αλλάξει τους κανόνες με κά̟ποιον ιδεαλιστικό τρόπο, αλλά να χρησιμοποιήσει τους υπάρχοντες θεσμούς για πολιτική πατρωνεία σε μεγάλη κλίμακα. Και η διαδικασίσ αυτή είναι στενά συνδεδεμένη με την χρηματοοικονομική απορρύθμιση.
Download Κείμενο (Brief) Δημόσιας Πολιτικής Νο. 112, 2010 PDF (1,009.09 KB) -
Working Paper No.604
28 June 2010
Three Futures for Postcrisis Banking in the Americas
AbstractThis would seem an opportune moment to reshape banking systems in the Americas. But any effort to rethink and improve banking must acknowledge three major barriers. The first is a crisis of vision: there has been too little consideration of what kind of banking system would work best for national economies in the Americas. The other two constraints are structural. Banking systems in Mexico and the rest of Latin America face a financial regulation trilemma, the logic and implications of which are similar to those of smaller nations’ macroeconomic policy trilemma. The ability of these nations to impose rules that would pull banking systems in the direction of being more socially productive and economically functional is constrained both by regional economic compacts (in the case of Mexico, NAFTA) and by having a large share of the domestic banking market operated by multinational banks.
For the United States, the structural problem involves the huge divide between Wall Street megabanks and the remainder of the US banking system. The ambitions, modes of operation, and economic effects of these two different elements of US banking are quite different. The success, if not survival, of one element depends on the creation of a regulatory atmosphere and set of enabling federal government subsidies or supports that is inconsistent with the success, or survival, of the other element.
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Working Paper No.603
18 June 2010
Does Excessive Sovereign Debt Really Hurt Growth?
AbstractThe worst global downturn since the Great Depression has caused ballooning budget deficits in most nations, as tax revenues collapse and governments bail out financial institutions and attempt countercyclical fiscal policy. With notable exceptions, most economists accept the desirability of expansion of deficits over the short term but fear possible long-term effects. There are a number of theoretical arguments that lead to the conclusion that higher government debt ratios might depress growth. There are other arguments related to more immediate effects of debt on inflation and national solvency. Research conducted by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff is frequently cited to demonstrate the negative impacts of public debt on economic growth and financial stability. In this paper we critically examine their work. We distinguish between a nation that operates with its own floating exchange rate and nonconvertible (sovereign) currency, and a nation that does not. We argue that Reinhart and Rogoff’s results are not relevant to the case of the United States.
Download Working Paper No. 603 PDF (138.23 KB) -
Working Paper No.602
11 June 2010
Fiscal Responsibility: What Exactly Does It Mean?
AbstractThe use of government fiscal stimulus to support the economy in the recent economic crisis has brought increases in government deficits and increased government debt. This has produced an interest in sustainable government debt and the role of deficits in the economy. This paper argues in favor of a concept of "responsible" government policy, referring to positions held by Franklin and Marshall Professor Will Lyons. The idea is that government should be responsible to the needs and desires of its citizens, but that this should go beyond physical security and education, to economic security. Building on the fallacy of composition and misplaced concreteness, it suggests that in an integrated macro system an increased desire to save on the part of the private sector will be self-defeating unless the government acts in a responsible manner to support those desires. This can only be done by government dissaving via an expenditure deficit. The outstanding government debt simply represents the desires of the public to hold safe financial assets, and can only be unsustainable if the public’s desires change. The government should always be responsive to these desires, and adjust its expenditure policy.
Download Working Paper No. 602 PDF (152.16 KB) -
Working Paper No.601
04 June 2010
Too Big to Fail in Financial Crisis
AbstractRegulatory forbearance and government financial support for the largest US financial companies during the crisis of 2007–09 highlighted a "too big to fail" problem that has existed for decades. As in the past, effects on competition and moral hazard were seen as outweighed by the threat of failures that would undermine the financial system and the economy. As in the past, current legislative reforms promise to prevent a reoccurrence.
This paper proceeds on the view that a better understanding of why too-big-to-fail policies have persisted will provide a stronger basis for developing effective reforms. After a review of experience in the United States over the last 40 years, it considers a number of possible motives. The explicit rationale of regulatory authorities has been to stem a systemic threat to the financial system and the economy resulting from interconnections and contagion, and/or to assure the continuation of financial services in particular localities or regions. It has been contended, however, that such threats have been exaggerated, and that forbearance and bailouts have been motivated by the "career interests" of regulators. Finally, it has been suggested that existing large financial firms are preserved because they serve a public interest independent of the systemic threat of failure they pose—they constitute a "national resource."
Each of these motives indicates a different type of reform necessary to contain too-big-to-fail policies. They are not, however, mutually exclusive, and may all be operative simultaneously. Concerns about the stability of the financial system dominate current legislative proposals; these would strengthen supervision and regulation. Other kinds of reform, including limits on regulatory discretion, would be needed to contain "career interest" motivations. If, however, existing financial companies are viewed as serving a unique public purpose, then improved supervision and regulation would not effectively preclude bailouts should a large financial company be on the brink of failure. Nor would limits on discretion be binding.
To address this motivation, a structural solution is necessary. Breakups through divestiture, perhaps encompassing specific lines of activity, would distribute the "public interest" among a larger group of companies than the handful that currently hold a disproportionate and growing concentration of financial resources. The result would be that no one company, or even a few, would appear to be irreplaceable. Neither economies of scale nor scope appear to offset the advantages of size reduction for the largest financial companies. At a minimum, bank merger policy that has, over the last several decades, facilitated their growth should be reformed so as to contain their continued absolute and relative growth. An appendix to the paper provides a review of bank merger policy and proposals for revision.
Download Working Paper No. 601 PDF (179.09 KB) -
Working Paper No.600
26 May 2010
Time and Poverty from a Developing Country Perspective
AbstractThis study is concerned with the measurement of poverty in the context of developing countries. We argue that poverty rankings must take into account time use dimensions of paid and unpaid work jointly. Reviewing the current state of the literature on this topic, our methodology introduces a critical but missing analytical distinction between time poverty and time deprivation. On this basis, we proceed to provide empirical evidence by using South African time use survey data compiled in 2000. Our findings show that existing methods that work well for advanced countries require modification when adopted in the case of a developing country. The results identify a group of adults who previously were inadvertently missing, as they were considered "time wealthy."
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One Pager No.3
20 May 2010
“The Spectre of Banking”
AbstractA year and a half after the collapse in the financial markets, the debate about necessary “reforms” is still in its early stages, and none of the debaters seriously claims that his solution will in fact prevent a new crisis. The problem is that the proposed remedies deal with superficial matters of industrial organization and regulatory procedure, while the real problems—outsized, ungovernable financial firms and rampant securitization—lie on a more profound level.
Download One-Pager No. 3 PDF (129.50 KB) -
One Pager No.2
19 May 2010
Reforms Without Politicians
AbstractCongress is currently debating new regulations for financial institutions in an effort to avoid a repeat of the recent crisis that brought the banking system to the brink. Some of those proposed changes would be valuable. But what nobody seems to have noticed is that the government already has the power to address some of the most important factors that contributed to the crisis. Today, right now, Washington could change a few key rules and prevent a repeat of the rampant speculation, and possible fraud, that led to so much trouble this last time around.
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One Pager No.1
17 May 2010
A Balancing Act
AbstractNow that America’s financial institutions have been brought back from the brink, the greatest threat to global economic stability is the gigantic trade imbalance between the United States, China, and other trading partners. A second big threat to economic stability, in the longer run, is global warming. Both problems are related to America’s addiction to cheap imports and foreign oil—bad habits that a clever cap-and-trade system could help us kick at last.
Download One-Pager No. 1 PDF (128.82 KB) -
Working Paper No.598
17 May 2010
The Economic and Financial Crises in CEE and CIS
AbstractThis paper looks at the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), where economies have been most dramatically hit by the global crisis and its impact is likely to be most long-lasting, especially among poor and vulnerable groups. Using poverty as the main axis, it looks at aspects of economic and social development in countries at similar poverty levels to identify the degree of fiscal space in each, as well as the different policy choices made. The paper argues that despite such economic fundamentals as increasing external debt, worsening current account imbalances, and demands for a balanced budget, governments have policy choices to make about how to protect different groups, especially the most vulnerable—including women.
Download Working Paper No. 598 PDF (363.85 KB) -
Working Paper No.597
11 May 2010
Bretton Woods 2 Is Dead, Long Live Bretton Woods 3?
AbstractThis paper sets out to investigate the forces and conditions that led to the emergence of global imbalances preceding the worldwide crisis of 2007–09, and both the likelihood and the potential sustainability of reemerging global imbalances as the world economy recovers from that crisis. The “Bretton Woods 2” hypothesis of sustainable global imbalances featuring a quasi-permanent US current account deficit overlooked that the domestic counterpart to the United States’ external deficit—soaring household indebtedness—was based not on safe debts but rather toxic ones. We critique the “global saving glut” hypothesis, and propose the “global dollar glut” hypothesis in its stead. With the US private sector in retrenchment mode, the question arises whether fiscal expansion might not only succeed in filling the gap in US domestic demand but also restart global arrangements along BW2 lines, albeit this time based on public debt—call it “Bretton Woods 3.” This paper explores the chances of a BW3 regime, highlighting the role of “dollar leveraging” in sustaining US trade deficits. Longer-term prospects for a postdollar standard are discussed in the light of John Maynard Keynes’s “bancor” plan.
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Public Policy Brief No.111
11 May 2010
Επιστροφή στην υστερία του ελλείμματος στις ΗΠΑ;
AbstractΣτο κείμενο αυτό, οι Yeva Nersisyan και ο L. Randall Wray υποστηρίζουν ότι τα ελλείμματα δεν επιβαρύνουν τις μελλοντικές γενεές με χρέη και δεν περιορίζουν τις ιδιωτικές δαπάνες. Οι συγγραφείς βασίζουν τα συμπεράσματά τους στην υπόθεση ότι ένα κυρίαρχο κράτος με δικό του νόμισμα δεν μπορεί να χρεοκοπήσει και στην άποψη ότι η κρατική χρηματοδότηση της κυβέρνησης είναι κάτι τελείως διαφορετικό από τη χρηματοδότηση ενός νοικοκυριού ή μιας επιχείρησης. Επιπλέον, επισημαίνουν ότι οι αυτόματοι σταθεροποιητές είναι αυτοί που έχουν αποτρέψει την οικονομική συρρίκνωση στις ΗΠΑ να μετατραπεί σε μια Μεγάλη Ύφεση, και όχι οι διασώσεις και το πακέτο στήριξης της οικονομίας. Οι συγγραφείς απορρίπτουν τις αβάσιμες ανησυχίες για τα ελλείμματα και τα χρέη, σημειώνοντας ότι αποκρύπτουν το πραγματικό ζήτημα, που είναι η απροθυμία των «γερακιών του ελλείμματος» να επιτρέψουν στην κυβέρνηση να εργαστεί για το καλό του λαού.
Download Κείμενο Δημόσιας Πολιτικής No. 111 PDF (869.24 KB) -
Public Policy Brief No.111
11 May 2010
Deficit Hysteria Redux?
AbstractThis brief by Yeva Nersisyan and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray argues that deficits do not burden future generations with debt, nor do they crowd out private spending. The authors base their conclusions on the premise that a sovereign nation with its own currency cannot become insolvent, and that government financing is unlike that of a household or firm. Moreover, they observe that automatic stabilizers, not government bailouts and the stimulus package, have prevented the US economic contraction from devolving into another Great Depression. The authors dispense with unsubstantiated concerns about deficits and debts, noting that they mask the real issue: the unwillingness of deficit hawks to allow government to work for the good of the people.
Download Public Policy Brief No. 111, 2010 PDF (1,023.02 KB) -
Working Paper No.596
10 May 2010
Infinite-variance, Alpha-stable Shocks in Monetary SVAR
AbstractThe process of constructing impulse-response functions (IRFs) and forecast-error variance decompositions (FEVDs) for a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) usually involves a factorization of an estimate of the error-term variance-covariance matrix V. Examining residuals from a monetary VAR, this paper finds evidence suggesting that all of the variances in V are infinite. Specifically, this study estimates alpha-stable distributions for the reduced-form error terms. The ML estimates of the residuals’ characteristic exponents α range from 1.5504 to 1.7734, with the Gaussian case lying outside 95 percent asymptotic confidence intervals for all six equations of the VAR. Variance-stabilized P-P plots show that the estimated distributions fit the residuals well. Results for subsamples are varied, while GARCH(1,1) filtering yields standardized shocks that are also all likely to be non-Gaussian alpha stable. When one or more error terms have infinite variance, V cannot be factored. Moreover, by Proposition 1, the reduced-form DGP cannot be transformed, using the required nonsingular matrix, into an appropriate system of structural equations with orthogonal, or even finite-variance, shocks. This result holds with arbitrary sets of identifying restrictions, including even the null set. Hence, with one or more infinite-variance error terms, structural interpretation of the reduced-form VAR within the standard SVAR model is impossible.
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Working Paper No.595
09 May 2010
The Recycling Problem in a Currency Union
AbstractThe recycling problem is general, and is not confined to a multicurrency setting: whenever there are surplus and deficit units—that is, everywhere—adjustment in real terms can be either upward or downward. The question is, Which? An attempt is made to formulate the problem in terms of the European Monetary Union. While the problem seems clear, the resolution is not. It is proposed to engage the issue through a detour consistent with the Maastricht rules. Inadequate as this is, it highlights the limits of technical arrangements when governments are confronted with political economy—namely, the inability to set the rules of the larger game from within a set of axiomatically predetermined rules dependent on the fact and practice of sovereignty. Even so, an attempt at persuasion through clarification of the issues—in particular, by highlighting the distinction between recycling and transfers—may be a useful preliminary. Some of the paper’s evocations, notably on oligopoly, may be taken as merely heuristic.
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Working Paper No.594
08 May 2010
Revisiting “New Cambridge”: The Three Financial Balances in a General Stock-flow Consistent Applied Modeling Strategy
AbstractThis paper argues that modified versions of the so-called “New Cambridge” approach to macroeconomic modeling are both quite useful for modeling real capitalist economies in historical time and perfectly compatible with the “vision” underlying modern Post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent macroeconomic models. As such, New Cambridge–type models appear to us as an important contribution to the tool kit available to applied macroeconomists in general, and to heterodox applied macroeconomists in particular.
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Working Paper No.593
07 May 2010
A Contribution to the Theory of Financial Fragility and Crisis
AbstractThe paper examines three aspects of a financial crisis of domestic origin. The first section studies the evolution of a debt-financed consumption boom supported by rising asset prices, leading to a credit crunch and fluctuations in the real economy, and, ultimately, to debt deflation. The next section extends the analysis to trace gradual evolution toward Ponzi finance and its consequences. The final section explains the link between the financial and the real sector of the economy, pointing to an inherent liquidity problem. The paper concludes with comments on the interactions between the three aspects.
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Working Paper No.592
06 May 2010
The Global Financial Crisis and a New Capitalism?
AbstractThe 2008 global financial crisis was the consequence of the process (1) of financialization, or the creation of massive fictitious financial wealth, that began in the 1980s,; and (2) the hegemony of a reactionary ideology—namely, neoliberalism—based on self-regulated and efficient markets. Although laissez-faire capitalism is intrinsically unstable, the lessons of the 1929 stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s were transformed into theories and institutions or regulations that led to the “30 glorious years of capitalism” (1948–77) and that could have helped avoid a financial crisis as profound as the present one. But it did not, because a coalition of rentiers and “financists” achieved hegemony and, while deregulating the existing financial operations, refused to regulate the financial innovations that made these markets even riskier. Neoclassical economics played the role of a meta-ideology as it legitimized, mathematically and “scientifically,” neoliberal ideology and deregulation. From this crisis a new democratic capitalist system will emerge, though its character is difficult to predict. It will not be financialized, but the glory years’ tendencies toward a global and knowledge-based capitalism in which professionals have more say than rentier capitalists, as well as the tendency to improve democracy by making it more social and participative, will be resumed.
Download Working Paper No. 592 PDF (362.90 KB)